We investigate the coordination and control problems of distributed discrete event systems that are composed of multiple subsystems subject to potential actuator and/or sensor faults. We model actuator faults as local controllability loss of certain actuator events and sensor faults as observability failure of certain sensor readings, respectively. Starting from automata-theoretic models that characterize behaviors of the subsystems in the presence of faulty actuators and/or sensors, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of actuator and sensor fault tolerant supervisors, respectively, and synthesize appropriate local post-fault supervisors to prevent the post-fault subsystems from jeopardizing local safety requirements. Furthermore, we apply an assume-guarantee coordination scheme to the controlled subsystems for both the nominal and faulty subsystems so as to achieve the desired specifications of the system. A multi-robot coordination example is used to illustrate the proposed coordination and control architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquitous deployment of information technology (IT) components has enabled persistent monitoring, coordination and control of large-scale engineering systems with distributed architectures, such as power grids, intelligent transportation systems, cooperative robotic teams and so on. Nevertheless, the application of the heterogeneous IT components has also made the system architectures more sophisticated, rendering them more vulnerable to unpredictable faults that may cause undesired or even catastrhophic consequences. Hence, how to detect and diagnose faults and how to guarantee safe and reliable operation of the engineering systems when faults occur are of great practical importance.
Q m,M and Q m,P are omitted, the satisfaction relation is equivalent to (∀t ∈ L(M ))[P P (t) ∈ L(P )].
In the Ramadge-Wonham supervisory control theory of DESs modeled as finite automata [25] , [26] , the event set Σ is partitioned into the set of controllable events Σ c and the set of uncontrollable events Σ uc . When the uncontrolled system is partially observed, Σ is also partitioned into the set of observable events Σ o and the set of unobservable events Σ uo . We associate with Σ o the natural projection P o : Σ * → Σ * o . A control decision γ ∈ 2 Σ is said to be admissible if Σ uc ⊆ γ, i.e., uncontrollable events can never be disabled. We define Γ = {γ ∈ 2 Σ |Σ uc ⊆ γ} as the set of admissible control decisions. Since a supervisor can only make decisions based on its observations, a partialobservation supervisor is a mapping S : P o [L(G)] → Γ; more specifically, when the plant G generates a string s, the supervisor observes P o (s) and enables events in S[P o (s)] accordingly. In practice, the supervisor S is often implemented as a DFA S = (Z, Σ, ξ, z 0 , Z m ) such that: (i) for each z ∈ Z and σ ∈ Σ uo , ξ(z, σ)! ⇒ ξ(z, σ) = z;
(ii) for each s ∈ L(S), Act S (ξ(s)) = S[P o (s)]. The closed-loop behaviors generated by G under the supervision of S are then given by L(S G), where S G represents the parallel composition of two DFAs S and G [1] , [27] .
Given a non-empty and prefix-closed specification language L = L over Σ, L is controllable (with respect to
L is observable (with respect to G and Σ o ) if (∀s, t ∈ L, σ ∈ Σ) [P o (s) =
. It is well known that there exists a supervisor S such that L(S G) = L if and only if L is controllable and observable [1] , [25] , [26] , [28] ; in this case, a DFA S = (Z, Σ, ξ, z 0 ) such that L(S) = L suffices to be a satisfactory supervisor. Otherwise, a supervisor S can be synthesized to satisfy L in a maximally permissive manner, i.e., L(S G) ⊆ L and for any other S such that L(S G) ⊆ L, it holds that L(S G) ⊂ L(S G) [29] .
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Distributed Discrete Event Systems subject to Faults
The distributed DES G under consideration is composed of n collaborating subsystems with unique identities, namely I = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each subsystem is modeled as an accessible [1] DFA G i = (Q i , Σ i , δ i , q i,0 ) (i ∈ I).
The global event set is defined as Σ = ∪ i∈I Σ i and we denote by P i the natural projection from Σ * to Σ * i . For any σ ∈ Σ, we denote by In(σ) = {i ∈ I|σ ∈ Σ i }. For each i ∈ I, the local event set Σ i is partitioned into the set of locally controllable events Σ i,c and the set of locally uncontrollable events Σ i,uc . We assume that (∀i, j ∈ I : i = j)[Σ i,uc ∩ Σ j,c = ∅].
(1)
Σ i is partitioned into the set of locally observable events Σ i,o and the set of locally unobservable events Σ i,uo . Let P i,o denote the natural projection from Σ * i to Σ * i,o . All the subsystems are coordinated via parallel composition, i.e., G = i∈I G i .
We are interested in the faults that may interfere with the nominal functionalities of the actuators and/or sensors equipped with the subsystems. In particular, we assume that the nominal supervisor S i implements the control decisions on the subsystem G i (i ∈ I) via K i local actuators:
Σ i,a = {η i,1 , η i,2 , . . . , η i,Ki } ⊆ Σ i,c ∩ Σ i,o .
More specifically, for any η i,m ∈ Σ i,a (m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K i }), we assume that In(η i,m ) = {i}; in other words, an actuator can only be enabled or disabled by its own local supervisor. The actuators in Σ i,a are assumed to be vulnerable to malfunctions, and we refer to h i,m as the actuator fault event corresponding to the case in which the supervisor loses the local controllability of the actuator event η i,m in G i .
Definition 2 (Actuator Faults):
For m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K i }, an actuator fault h i,m occurred in the subsystem G i (i ∈ I) indicates that the actuator event η i,m ∈ Σ i,a becomes locally uncontrollable for G i . The set of possible actuator fault events in G i is represented by the set Σ F i,a = {h i,1 , h i,2 , . . . , h i,Ki }. According to Definition 2, an undesired control action may not be prohibited by a local supervisor as a consequence of an actuator fault; this setting is hence consistent with the general understanding of actuator faults [30] .
We assume that an actuator fault is permanent and local controllability of a fault actuator cannot be recovered after the fault.
In addition to actuators, for the purpose of monitoring and controlling the subsystem G i (i ∈ I), we denote by Σ i,s = {σ i,1 , σ i,2 , . . . , σ i,Ni } ⊆ Σ i,o ∩ Σ i,uc
the set of local sensor readings whose occurrences can be detected by the local supervisor S i . In general, the local observability of the sensor readings in Σ i,s is suspicious of loss [13] , [31] ; such a situation may correspond to the breakdown of the sensors that monitor and record the occurrences of the event. Other than actuators, it is reasonable to assume a sensor reading to be locally uncontrollable since the local supervisor shall not prevent a sensor reading from being received. For all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N i }, we use a sensor fault event f i,k to capture the circumstance that the sensor reading σ i,k ∈ Σ i,s fails to be obtained by S i .
Definition 3 (Sensor Faults):
For k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N i }, a sensor fault f i,k occurred in the subsystem G i (i ∈ I)
refers to as the loss of local observability of the sensor reading σ i,k ∈ Σ i,s . The set of possible sensor fault events in G i is represented by the set Σ F i,s = {f i,1 , f i,2 , . . . , f i,Ni }. We assume that observability loss of a subsystem's sensor reading is also permanent. To distinguish a faulty sensor reading from a nominal one, we attach a fault label to the corresponding sensor reading event after it fails to be accessed, resulting in the following set of faulty sensor readings:
B. Problem Statement
Given a non-empty and prefix-closed control specification L ⊆ L(G) for the distributed DES G, it is shown in the literature [32] , [33] that under the assumption (1), a nominal supervisor
Under the supervision of S i (i ∈ I), no undesired behaviors will be generated from the subsystem G i in the nominal operation. However, undesired strings can arise due to the effective control actions of the nominal supervisor on the faulty subsystem. In this case, a fault tolerant coordination and control is required so as to enforce the accomplishment of the global specification before and after the occurrences of potential faults.
It is also required that safe operation of all the subsystems of G be assured in spite of possible loss of local actuating and/or sensing capabilities. The local safety requirements are captured by a non-empty and prefix-closed
, which includes all the tolerable behaviors of G i that should be satisfied (in the sense of Definition 1) in both nominal and fault-pruned operations.
Without loss of generality, we assume that
holds for all i ∈ I. Formally, the problem that is addressed in this paper can be stated as follows.
is controlled by a nominal supervisor S i (i ∈ I) in order to satisfy the local safety L saf e i and the prefix-closed global specification L. Suppose that for each i ∈ I, subsystem G i is equipped with actuators Σ i,a and sensor readings Σ i,s that may be subject to faults, find a family S F i of post-fault supervisors for the subsystem G i such that: (i) the local safety requirements shall always be satisfied despite the actuator and sensor faults, i.e., S
, where G F i denotes the subsystem G i subject to the faults; (ii) for any subset I ∈ 2 I of subsystems whose behaviors are influenced by faults and for any i ∈ I , S F i will steer the faulty subsystems in order to meet the global specification, i.e.,
In this paper, objective (i) of Problem 1 is achieved by local fault tolerant control reconfiguration of the post-fault subsystem(s) (cf. Sections IV and V). Objective (ii) will be fulfilled by leveraging the idea of assume-guarantee post-fault coordination (cf. Section VI), in which the synthesized post-fault supervisors will be further refined if necessary to fulfill the global specification.
IV. AN ACTIVE FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL ARCHITECTURE WITH ACTUATOR FAULTS
From Definition 2, an actuator fault leads to unexpected loss of (local) controllability of the corresponding actuator event; in other words, the generated language of the controlled subsystem S i G i may deviate from the presumed local behaviors L i in a faulty mode, since the local supervisor S i can no longer disable a faulty actuator event so
as to prevent an undesired string from being generated. As a consequence, the presence of the faulty actuator may jeopardize the accomplishment of the global specification L. In this section, by assuming that actuator fault events are locally observable, we aim at tackling the actuator fault tolerant control problem with an active approach [2] .
A. Construction of Subsystems subject to an Actuator Fault
Since Σ i,a ⊂ Σ i,o holds both before and after the occurrence of an actuator fault, therefore we can assume that an actuator fault can be detected instantly by means of FDI techniques; i.e., for any i ∈ I and m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K i }, h i,m is assumed to be locally observable. The possible successive behaviors of a subsystem after the occurrence of an actuator fault are characterized in terms of the following "suffix automaton".
Definition 4 (Suffix Automaton):
The suffix automaton of an accessible DFA G = (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 ) following a string
It can be verified that the suffix automaton G suf (t) preserves all the possible successive behaviors of the DES
To prevent unsafe local behaviors from emerging in a faulty mode, the operation of the nominal supervisor should be disabled and it is necessary to switch from the nominal supervisor to a new post-fault supervisor afterwards, yielding an active approach to the actuator fault tolerance. For convenience of presentation, we assume that an actuator η i,m ∈ Σ i,a (m = 1, 2, . . . , K i ) becomes locally uncontrollable in the subsystem G i (i ∈ I) and the actuator fault event h i,m is detected when a string t i,0 ∈ L i has been generated during the nominal operation. The uncontrolled post-fault subsystem G i corresponding to the generation of t i,0 and the detection of h i,m , written as
where different from G i , the controllability and observability status of the post-fault event set Σ m,a i is given by
and
respectively. Note that the actuator fault event is not locally controllable. The following example illustrates the construction of the post-fault model of a given subsystem in the form of a suffix automaton.
Example 1: For a subsystem G i shown in Fig. 1 , in which ). In this paper, we require that the post-fault supervisor S m,a i be synthesized so that the local safety L saf e i can be maintained. Specifically, if h i,m is detected when a string t i,0 is generated, the post-fault specification for G m,a i is given by:
It can be inferred from Definition 4 and the prefix-closeness of L A general architecture is depicted in Fig. 3 to achieve active fault tolerant control of the subsystem G i (i ∈ I) in the presence of an faulty actuator η i,m . In the nominal mode, no actuator fault takes place and the control loop is closed on the nominal supervisor S i that enables appropriate locally controllable events based on the observation P i,o (t i,0 ) when the subsystem generates a string t i,0 . Once the actuator η i,m becomes faulty, the actuator fault event h i,m is generated to interrupt the nominal operation of S i to prevent any unsafe behaviors from emerging in G i .
In this case, we test the actuator fault tolerance of the post-fault subsystem G (t i,0 ).
We now study the procedure of testing the actuator fault tolerance property after an actuator fault. Thanks to the standard inf C(·) operator, which computes the infimal prefix-closed controllable sublanguage of a given language with respect to another given language and a given set of uncontrollable events [1] , we present the following theorem that states the necessary and sufficient conditions of the actuator fault tolerance of L (G after disabling all the local events that can be feasibly disabled. Suppose that there exists a string
(t i,0 ), this means that there is no way to prevent , we associate the the subsystem G i (i ∈ I) with the following bank of safety supervisors:
where each safety supervisor
is satisfied in a maximally permissive manner, under the assumption that η i,m is locally uncontrollable. In the case that t i,0 ∈ L 
It then follows from (10) that
Therefore, as long as G ; therefore, we adopt online control techniques for the synthesis of S m,a i (see, e.g., [34] , [35] ), which generally possess polynomial complexity at each locally observable event along a trajectory in L post i .
C. Fault Tolerant Control with Multiple Actuator Faults
In the previous subsection, we discussed local fault tolerant control under the assumption that there are no consecutive occurrences of multiple actuator faults. However, multiple faults may occur in many practical engineering systems. Therefore, it is necessary to extend the proposed active fault tolerant control architecture to address multiple actuator faults. In the presence of multiple faults, the subsystem shall then switch from either the nominal mode to a faulty mode, or one faulty mode to another. We introduce the following set of mode-switching events to handle multiple faults in G i ,
where we denote by the 0-th mode the nominal mode. The mode-switching event h m1,m2 i is generated when η i,m2
becomes faulty in the m 1 -th faulty mode. For convenience of presentation, we write h 0,m i = h i,m , indicating the switch from the nominal mode to the m-th faulty mode. It is reasonable to assume m 2 = 0 in (11) since the subsystem cannot return to the nominal mode from a faulty one. Similar to the actuator fault events, all the mode-switching events in Σ sw i,a are assumed to be locally observable. We study the case in which actuators η i,1 , η i,2 , . . . , η i,Ki of the subsystem G i may become faulty. When there is no fault, the subsystem stays in the nominal mode, the fault tolerant control is inactive. After some faults occur and the subsystem enters a faulty mode, the active fault tolerant control framework depicted in Fig. 3 is inherited here to resolve the impacts of the faults. Without loss of generality, we still assume that the first actuator fault occurs when a string t i,0 is generated in G i . Thus the uncontrolled post-fault subsystem model of G i in the presence of multiple faults is given by
Furthermore, we consider that the actuator faults may occur in arbitrary orders. Toward this regards, we define the controllable and observable events in the presence of K i possible faulty actuators as follows, respectively:
The local control objective of the post-fault supervisor for the subsystem G i subject to multiple actuator faults is to guarantee the accomplishment of the local safety specification L saf e i
. Therefore, the post-fault specification is obtained as
Since h 
Otherwise, S
F,a i
shall be implemented via online control techniques [34] , [35] .
We use S . Formally, we can write that
. Furthermore, according to (14) , it holds that (16) can always be satisfied. By Definition 1, (16) is equivalent to S
, which completes the proof.
V. SAFE SUPERVISORY CONTROL WITH SENSOR FAULTS
This section is concerned with the synthesis of the local post-fault supervisor for a subsystem whose nominal operation suffers from sensor faults. The proposed fault tolerant supervisory control scheme includes two major ingredients: (i) construction of an automaton model of the subsystem in the presence of local sensor faults; (ii) synthesis of the corresponding post-fault supervisor(s) after the sensor faults.
A. Modeling Sensor Faults in Discrete Event Systems
Let G 0 i = S i G i denote the nominal mode of the subsystem G i (i ∈ I) under control. Since undesired behaviors may arise after occurrences of potential faults as a consequence of executing nominal supervision commands on the fault-pruned subsystem, we aim at exploring the behaviors generated by G 0 i when one sensor reading σ i,k ∈ Σ i,s becomes faulty. As defined in (3), the suspicious sensor readings in Σ f i,s introduce N i faulty modes to the subsystem G i in addition to the nominal mode. For k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N i }, we assume that the k-th faulty mode of G i is modeled
where
, and the transition function δ i,k is defined as follows: for any q i,k,l ∈ Q i,k and σ ∈ Σ i,k ,
Note that the initial state q i,k,0 of G i,k is not specified at this point since it depends on at which state of G i the sensor fault f i,k occurs. Furthermore, we define the transition δ i,k (q i,l , σ f i,k ) in addition to δ i,k (q i,l , σ i,k ) in the k-th faulty mode. For convenience of presentation, we also use f i,k to denote the associated mapping
i.e., the sensor fault f i,k indicates the transition from the nominal mode G i to the k-th faulty mode G i,k . In other words, f i,k (q i,l ) = q i,k,l indicates that f i,k occurs when G i evolves to q i,l and the initial state of G i,k turns to be q i,k,l . Since we pose no assumption on when the sensor fault may occur, the unified model of G i subject to one suspicious sensor reading σ i,k can then be constructed as
In addition to G k i , we proceed to the construction of S k i , which is the counterpart of S i in the k-th faulty mode. For convenience of presentation, we assume that the nominal supervisor S i can be realized as the following DFA:
Similar to G i,k , we also use S i,k to denote the potential behaviors of S i in the k-th faulty mode; more specifically, S i,k is given by the following automaton without a specified initial state:
where X i,k = {x i,k,l |x i,l ∈ X i }, and for any
In other words, we make sure that uncontrollable events shall never be disabled regardless of possible sensor faults by adding self-loops that are labeled by uncontrollable events and faulty sensor readings to all the states in the faulty mode. Therefore, the unified model of S i in the presence of the unobservalbe sensor reading σ f i,k is obtained as
where 
where the set of post-fault local events is given by Σ k,s i
Note that each step (18)- (21) of the construction procedure of G k,s i requires no prior knowledge of the state at which the sensor fault event occurs and hence can be computed offline.
We use the following example to demonstrate the construction procedure of G k,s i .
Example 2: (Rephrased from [30] , Example 4) We consider a subsystem G i (i ∈ I) whose DFA representation is depicted in Fig. 4 , where is similar to that of the closed-loop system subject to "sensor erasure attack" in [30] . Nevertheless, we use the sensor fault event to clearly distinguish the nominal part of the system from the faulty part. Furthermore, the procedure developed in [30] considers the worst-case scenario, whereas by introducing the sensor fault event, we can see from Example 2 that if a sensor fault takes place after the last occurrence of the corresponding sensor reading, the fault will pose no impact on the successive behaviors of the system.
B. SF-safe Controllability and Sensor Fault Tolerant Control
By construction, G generates any unsafe behaviors; (ii) the fault-pruned controlled subsystem should be able to stop its evolution before generating any unsafe strings.
,o be the post-fault observation projection. We introduce a variant of safe controllability [21] , [30] in the context of active fault tolerant control, namely SF-safe controllability, to achieve the aforementioned control objectives for a fault-pruned subsystem.
Definition 6 (SF-
where the safe controllability condition SC states as follows:
(in the sense of Definition 1), there exists: (i) a proper prefix t i,1 of t i that assures the detection of f i,k before the fault-pruned subsystem generates any unsafe behavior (safe diagnosable); (ii) a locally controllable event after this prefix but still prior to the execution of the unsafe behavior (safe controllable). In other words, after the detection of the fault, unsafe behaviors can always be prohibited by disabling this locally controllable event.
The above discussion is formally summarized as the following theorem, which asserts that SF-safe controllability is the necessary and sufficient condition for G The occurrence of the sensor fault event f i,k is determined by a diagnoser. The construction procedure of the diagnoser is presented in [3] and is omitted here. Before proceeding to the sensor fault tolerant control strategy for 
The set of first-entered certain states is 
We adopt an active approach to address the loss of the sensor reading σ i,k , as shown in Fig. 9 . Different from the actuator fault tolerant control, the sensor fault event f i,k is assumed to be locally unobservable and therefore, detection of f i,k should be performed by associating G 
which turns to be a prefix-closed sublanguage of L(G 
C. Fault Tolerant Control with Multiple Faulty Sensors
We now consider the case in which all sensor readings in Σ i,s may become faulty. For such a purpose, we first aim at constructing the DFA model of G 
, and the transition function δ i,F is defined as follows: for any q i,F,l ∈ Q i,F and σ ∈ Σ i,F ,
Therefore, similar to (18), the DFA model of G i in the presence of multiple sensor faults can be obtained as
On the other hand, the DFA model S F i of S i in the multi-fault is computed, and we have
where X i,F = {x i,F,l |x i,l ∈ X i }, and for any x i,F,l ∈ X i,F and σ ∈ Σ i,F , ξ i,F (x i,F,l , σ) is formally defined as
The unified model of S F i is hence obtained as
is computed in a similar way as (21)
where the set of post-fault local events is given by Σ F,s i = Σ i,F and can be further partitioned as
A sensor fault tolerant control framework is developed in Fig. 10 to resolve the impacts of multiple sensor faults, where P 
in the faulty mode but before f i,k is detected, and t i is the string generated by the post-fault controlled subsystem (25), we can write that
for some j such that there exists q ij ∈ q
which is equivalent to S
D. Supervisory Control with Combinations of Faults
So far, we have only considered one singe type of faults that may occur in a subsystem. In this subsection, we aim at extending the proposed fault tolerant control approaches to take both actuator and sensor faults into consideration. Without loss of generality, we consider a subsystem G i (i ∈ I) in which both Σ i,s = {σ i } and Σ i,a = {η i } are singletons. We assume that the sensor fault occurs before the actuator fault, and the fault tolerance of the supervisory control strategy of G i is sketched as follows. Note that our methodology can be generalized to other combinations of faults. (1) When no fault is detected in G i , the nominal supervisor S i is employed such that
. With Σ is defined in Theorem 7. In this faulty mode, we update the local event sets as (6) and (7) Theorem 8: For the subsystem G i (i ∈ I) that is subject to actuator faults in Σ F i,a and sensor faults in Σ F i,s , the proposed fault tolerant techniques depicted in Fig. 3 and Fig. 10 will result 
VI. ASSUME-GUARANTEE POST-FAULT COORDINATION OF DISTRIBUTED DESS Theorem 8 guarantees that local safety of each subsystem can be enforced after switching to post-fault supervisor(s). Nevertheless, undesirable behaviors may still arise when post-fault subsystems are coordinated with the nominal ones, leading to the violation of the global specification L. We resolve this concern in this section by developing fault tolerant coordination strategies among the subsystems . In particular, an assume-guarantee paradigm [23] is exploited to efficiently refine the local supervisors in order to achieve the global specification.
A. Essentials of Compositional Verification
We first review the completion DFAs in the compositional verification procedures that are presented in [23] .
Definition 9 (Completion): Given G = (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 , Q m ) with an "error" state q e ∈ Q, the completion of G is defined as a DFAG = (Q, Σ,δ, q 0 , Q m ) withQ = Q ∪ {q e }, and
It can be shown that
is a DFA such that L m (coG) := Σ * − L m (G) and can be constructed by swapping the marked states ofG with its non-marked states and vice versa. Recall Definition 1, it is shown in [23] that a system M violates a property P if and only if the error state q e is reachable in M P , whereP is the completion of P .
An assume-guarantee formula is a triple A M P , where M is the system, P is the property to be verified and A is an assumption about M 's environment, each of which is represented by a corresponding DFA. The formula holds if whenever M is part of a system satisfying A, the system must also guarantee the property P , i.e., ∀E, E M |= A implies that E M |= P [27] . It is shown in [27] that when Σ P ⊆ Σ A ∪ Σ M , A M P if and only if q e is unreachable in A M P , i.e., M A |= P . A series of symmetric and asymmetric proof rules are incorporated for the assume-guarantee paradigm. When M = i∈I M i is a system that is composed of n components, the following symmetric proof rule SYM-N [27] is adopted:
where A i is the assumption about M i 's environment and coA i is the complement of A i . For i ∈ I, we require that
It is shown that the SYM-N proof rule is sound and complete [27] .
The assumption A in an assume-guarantee formula need not be unique, and we are particularly interested in the weakest assumption about a system's environment. Formally, when n = 2, the weakest assumption is defined as follows.
Definition 10 (Weakest Assumption): [27] Let M 1 and M 2 be two system components defined over Σ 1 and Σ 2 , respectively, and P be a property defined over Σ P . Let Σ A := (Σ 1 ∪ Σ P ) ∩ Σ 2 be an interface alphabet, the weakest assumption for M 1 is a DFA A w defined over Σ A such that for any component M 2 , true M 1 P A (M 2 ) P if and only if true M 2 A w , where P A denotes the natural projection from Σ * 2 to Σ * A . For each i ∈ I, let Σ −i := j∈I−{i} Σ j denote the set of events that belong to all the subsystems except G i .
By setting M −i = j∈I−{i} M j and Σ Ai = (Σ i ∪ Σ P ) ∩ Σ −i , the weakest assumption A i with respect to M i , M −i and P can be constructed according to Definition 10. Note that the number of states of A i is generally less than the number of states of M i ; therefore, deployment of the assume-guarantee reasoning can efficiently justify i∈I M i |= P by avoiding the computation of the parallel composition i∈I M i .
B. Fault Tolerant Coordination of Distributed DESs
In this subsection, we propose an assume-guarantee scheme to coordinate nominal subsystems with subsystems after switching to post-fault supervisor(s). To apply the SYM-N proof rule for the coordination of the controlled distributed DES, we use L ⊆ Σ * as the property to be verified and let M i := G 0 i (i ∈ I) denote component module of the controlled subsystem in the nominal mode. In this case, the weakest assumption A i with respect to M i and L is a DFA that is defined over Σ Ai := Σ −i . Since the SYM-N rule is sound and complete, all the assumptions A i (i ∈ I) jointly satisfy the (n + 1)-th premise of the SYM-N proof rule.
For the sake of simplicity of presentation, we assume that operation of one subsystem M i (i ∈ I) suffers from possible actuator/sensor faults and switches to a post-fault supervisor. The post-fault counterpart of M i ,
The weakest assumption with respect to the post-fault subsystem module M F i and the global specification L, written as A F i , is also defined over Σ −i and can be computed accordingly via existing methods [23] .
The assume-guarantee paradigm for the post-fault coordination among the subsystems of G is illustrated in Fig. 11 . The proposed coordination scheme first seeks to maintain the global specification even in the presence of a subsystem with post-fault local supervisor(s). The following proposition states the necessary and sufficient condition under which the successful coordination can be ensured without further supervisor refinement.
Proof: On the one hand, defined over Σ −i , A 
) always holds for each i ∈ I. Hence, we can write that
is an appropriate assumption with respect to M inf i and L. Since 
where the last inclusion is enforced by the satisfaction of i∈I M CO i |= L and the completeness of the SYM-N rule.
The proof is hence completed.
The intuition behind Theorem 9 states that if the infimally feasible behaviors performed by each subsystem in the fault operation cannot jointly maintain the global specification, there is no other way to achieve a successful coordination.
Starting from the component modules M j (j = i) and M F i , the coordination procedure shown in Fig. 11 states as follows:
(1) Following the detection of actuator/sensor faults, the subsystem G i switches to the post-fault supervisor S 1 SYN-CO stands for "synthesis for coordination
Algorithm 1: The SYN-CO Algorithm 
A counterexample c ∈ Σ * is returned by the compositional verification procedure 11 :
Compute a maximally permissive coordination supervisor S
Compute A Furthermore, it has been shown that the compositional verification with the SYM-N proof rule always terminates and correctly reports whether or not i∈I M CO i |= L [27] ; in other words, when no more counterexample is generated, we can conclude that i∈I M CO i |= L will not violate the specification L, i.e., the correctness of the SYN-CO algorithm can be achieved. 
VII. A MULTI-ROBOT COORDINATION EXAMPLE
This section demostrates the effectiveness of the proposed fault tolerant coordination and control framework for distributed DESs through a more comprehensive example. To characterize the behaviors of the robots within the DES framework, the events of this example are defined in Table 1 . The local event set Σ i (i = 1, 2, 3) for robot G i is defined as follows:
We assume that
and D 1 open ∈ Σ 2 since they all can be viewed as the information that is transmitted among G 1 , G 2 and G 3 via communication. All the events are assumed to be locally observable in the nominal mode. The set of each robot's sensor readings is given by Σ i,s :
as the actuators for i = 1, 3, and let Σ 2,a = Σ 2,c := {G 2 to2, G 2 to1, r} be the set of actuators of G 2 .
We denote by G i (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) the DFA model of G i 's behaviors among the rooms of interest in the environment.
Starting from Room 1, G 2 can enter Room 2 through D 2 and can also move to Room 3 through
is open by the other two robots, G 2 can move to both Rooms 2 and 3 through D 1 . In this example, we only consider the possible behaviors of G 2 between Rooms 1 to Room 2 and the corresponding model G 2 is depicted in We assume that a fire alarm is triggered in Room 2. The goal is that G 2 must respond promptly to the alarm by It is worth pointing out that Fig. 15, Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 also demonstrate Under the supervision of S F,a 3 , the robot G 3 should stays in Room 1 and open D 1 . After the post-fault supervisor reconfiguration, the assume-guarantee coordination framework shown in Fig. 11 is applied to coordinate G 3 with the other two robots. In this case, we can verify that the Proposition 2 cannot hold any more and we need to design the coordination supervisors for each subsystem. In particular, it is easy to find out that G 2 need not reconfigure the local control policies and S CO 2 = S 2 , whereas the coordination supervisor S In other words, the robot G 1 should enter Room 3 to open D 1 cooperatively with G 3 so that the global task can be achieved.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a fault tolerant coordination and control framework for distributed DESs that are composed of multiple subsystems. The proposed coordination and control framework ensures the accomplishment of the global specification in the presence of sensor and actuator faults. By introducing automata-theoretic methods to characterize the behaviors of each subsystem that is affected by various faults, appropriate post-fault supervisors are synthesized such that local safety can be ensured. In addition, an assume-guarantee coordination scheme is exploited to accomplish the global specification after the post-fault supervisor reconfiguration. The effectiveness of our proposed approach is demonstrated by an illustrative example.
Some problems are of interest for future investigations. For example, extensions of the proposed fault tolerant coordination and control architecture to combinations of other types of faults are worth of study. In addition to fault tolerant control problems, coordination and control reconfiguration strategies for distributed DESs subject to intentional attacks are also expected to be explored.
